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Editorial2026-03-26 09:20:00

Give me 3 lek to enter the dance, give me 300 and I can't leave

Shkruar nga Gjergj Zefi
Give me 3 lek to enter the dance, give me 300 and I can't leave
Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu /

Trump entered the war with the language of force and the conviction that imposition is enough. Now he is paying many times over to get out of it, because arrogance is no substitute for service reports, coordination with allies, or the weight of strategic cost.

There is a fundamental difference between the politician who is driven by impulse and the leader who is guided by judgment. In the case of the war with Iran, Donald Trump is proving this difference to himself. He spent a lot to get into this conflict, not only in military and financial terms, but also in diplomatic capital, in international credibility and in regional stability. Today, the paradox is even more brutal: he is spending even more to get out of it. Not because the war, in essence, had no security reasons or did not produce real consequences that needed to be addressed. But because the way he entered it was truncated, hasty and permeated with an arrogance that is often confused with determination.

The first mistake was not the use of force, but the illusion that force would solve the problem by itself. Agency reports showed that American intelligence assessments did not see the Iranian regime on the verge of collapse; on the contrary, it appeared damaged but still stable. Regional officials also warned that Washington had underestimated Tehran's willingness to escalate. When a president goes to war while ignoring precisely this kind of information, he is not demonstrating strength of character; he is showing strategic weakness. Because a true leader does not only trust his instincts, but also knows how to listen to what he does not like.

The second mistake was the lack of serious coordination with the allies. Europe did not react as a bloc mobilized behind Washington; on the contrary, several European capitals openly refused to get involved, citing a lack of consultation and uncertainty about American intentions. Even the Gulf partners showed reservations, distrust, and fear that they were being used as spectators of a war launched without a clear political architecture for the day after. This is precisely the point where the difference between an impulsive commander and a statesman is measured: the former thinks that the allies will follow him due to the gravity of American power; the latter builds the conditions in advance so that the allies will have an interest in following him.

The third mistake was the narrative's blatant arrogance. Asking Iran to "admit defeat" while you yourself are sending mediators, testing ceasefire plans, and trying to cool energy markets is a sign of a political contradiction that the adversary immediately reads.

The White House threatened to hit Iran “even harder,” while at the same time acknowledging that it had a proposal to end the war and that contacts were continuing. This language may produce strong headlines for domestic opinion, but it rarely produces lasting agreements in diplomacy. Because the other side doesn’t just see the words; it sees the anxiety behind them.

And American anxiety is palpable. Oil prices move with every sign of a ceasefire or escalation. The conflict has rattled markets, and the Strait of Hormuz has become the linchpin of the global energy crisis. This means that the cost of war is no longer measured in missiles, planes, and bases; it is measured in inflation, in market jitters, in pressure from energy-importing partners, and in the need to quickly devise a political exit. So Trump is not just footing the bill for entering the war. He is paying interest every day that he cannot find a convincing way out of it.

Thus, on the one hand, the US is presented as a power that wants to impose the conditions for ending the war. On the other hand, Iran is not only not accepting the narrative of defeat, but is also expanding the table, demanding that any ceasefire also include Lebanon and the offensive against Hezbollah. This means that Trump entered the war thinking that he would manage only the military front, but is now forced to negotiate the entire regional knot that he himself contributed to ignite. It is the classic difference between an easy entry into a crisis and a difficult exit from it.

In diplomacy, force is valuable only when accompanied by a sense of proportion. The leader is not the one who enters the battle first, but the one who knows why he enters, with whom he enters, what political objective he seeks, and how to exit without turning tactical success into strategic defeat. Trump, in this episode, behaved like a player who believed that maximum pressure and maximalist rhetoric would automatically break the opponent. But serious wars are not television spectacles. They are a test of the nerves of the state, the patience of alliances, and the leader's ability not to confuse noise with authority.

Therefore, Trump's problem is not that he entered an unjust war in the sense of a security alarm. The problem is that he entered it badly: without properly weighing the information, without harmonizing the allied front, and with the conviction that personal arrogance can replace diplomatic architecture. That is why he is now paying more dearly for the exit than he paid for the entry./ Pamphlet

trump lufta jep 3 lekë me hy në valle dhe jep 300 e nuk del dot gjergj zefi

2 Komente

  1. T
    Tony

    Disa njerez kujtojne se skuqen petullat me uje.

    1. F
      Feti Dema

      Pyetja e parë: A ka zgjedhje të lira, të drejta dhe të barabarta në SHBA? Tramp i kontestoi zgjedhjet e 2020 me pretendimin se ja vodhën fitoren. Këtu filloi mllefi i parë ndaj Donald Tramp. Pyetja e dytë: A i akordon Amerika Izraelit disa miliard dollar për mbrojtjen e saj nga çdo rrezik i jashtëm? Pyetja tre: Cilat janë kompetencat ekstra që lobi Izraelit në SHBA shfrytëzon për të ndikuar në zgjedhjet në SHBA? Pyetja katër: Për zgjedhjet për guvernator shteti, prokuror, gjyqtar, kongresmen dhe senator, në shtete dhe për ato federale a janë të avantazhuar ata (lobi I) duke përcaktuar gati avantazhe ndaj të preferuarëve prej tyre? Pyetja e pestë: A shkon ky avantazhim në favor të fiksimit të krahut revanshist të Netanjahut për krijimin e Izraelit Biblik me shtrirje nga Nili në Eufrat? Pyetja e gjashtë: A mund të vihet në rresht pjesa më e madhe e amerikanëve për realizimin e planit të Izraelit Biblik? Pyetja e shtatë: A ndodhet Donald Tramp si ajo ajo nusia në shtëpinë me dhjetë pleqë që nuk e di se kujt tja prish e kujt t'ja ndreq? Z.Zefi ! Unë po vihem në rolin e avokatit të Iranit, Ju vihuni në krahun e Trampit në një bashkëbisedim për mbylljen e konfliktit. Ja versioni im: Na keni ngrën në besë Na keni goditur she keni eleminuar drejtuesit e shtetit kur ishim në bisedime për zgjidhjen e konfliktit. Të gjitha do ti harrojmë e do meremi vesh, por Ju jepni garanci që miku dhe bashkëluftëtuari juaj heq dorë nga Izraeli Biblik, me shtrirje nga lumi NIL deri në lumin Eufrat? Materialin bërthamor po e dorëzojmë në ruajtje në një vënd asnjëanës. Jepni Ju SHBA garanci që Izraeli nuk do përdor raketa balistike taktike me mbushje bërthamore? Delni Ju garant që do na merni hakën? Unë nuk do i përdor raketat balistike kundër Iranit, por po i përdori Izraeli Irani çfarë do bëj sehir? Irani heq dorë nga mbështetja e miqëve të tij në lindjen e mesme, si Hezbullah dhe hutët, por a e ndal Izraeli goditjen ndaj Libanit? A i ndal Izraeli goditjen për ndryshimet e regjimeve në vënde të tjera me anë të forcës ushtarake në bashkëpunim? Z.Tramp ! Do paqe hajt ta nënëshkruajmë. Amerikanët të votuan si 'President Për Paqe'. Shiko se po të pëdorin si kokë turku. Z.Zef ! Punët janë ngatërruar keqas dhe fillesat datojnë larg. Por 1913 koperimi Rotshild dhe Rokfeler dhe avatazhet e 'Parisë së Bankierëve' e kanë varros demokracinë dhe paqen. Ndaj Tramp ndoshta synoi të vendoste pak rregull në 'stanin e derrave'. Këtu fillon dhe mbaron mllefosja ndaj Donald Tramp. Dhe mesa duket të gjithë në botë kanë mbajtur shënime.

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