FLASH
Shkruar nga Howard W. French
In diplomacy, the American president always seems to follow his transactional view of human affairs...
When US President Donald Trump's 28-point plan for peace in Ukraine was first released in late November, its potential consequences were widely seen as a complete disaster for the besieged country.
The conditions, some of which have been dropped, withdrawn, or otherwise modified by Trump’s national security team, would have forced Ukraine to cede strategically important territories to its east that Russia has been unable to seize, even at the cost of heavy troop losses. Equally disastrous for Kiev were clauses that would have required it to reduce the size of its armed forces, permanently bar it from joining NATO, and return billions of dollars in assets seized by Russia, enabling Ukraine’s aggressor to rapidly rearm.
But as bad as the ill-fated plan may have been for Ukraine, its implications for the state of American diplomacy and Washington's standing in the world during Trump's second presidency are perhaps even worse.
By blinding Europe with a series of proposals to end the war in Ukraine that barely took into account the continent’s concerns, the United States has gravely deepened the sense of disconnect between Washington and its European allies that has been building since Trump’s first term. By now, after decades of tightly intertwined interdependence, mistrust has become a central feature of transatlantic relations. Regardless of what happens next in Ukraine or how the rest of Trump’s time in office plays out, it will be difficult to regain mutual trust.
In the shorter term, however, even the fundamental weakening of the United States’ most important relationship is not the worst damage. What the Trump administration’s recent diplomacy has fully revealed is the utterly erratic, unplanned, and personalized character of the president’s approach to dealing with the rest of the world.
While a series of previous American presidents relied on a gradually built and finely balanced system for conducting foreign relations, the Trump administration navigates according to the president's domestic whims.
This has resulted, in part, from the way Trump has dismantled the country’s diplomatic architecture by appointing Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. The traditional separation between these two roles was intended to allow the former to lead in the practical practice of diplomacy, while the latter focused on coordinating intelligence, defense, and diplomatic contributions from the country’s vast national security apparatus and thereby helping the president choose foreign policy options and decisions.
By all accounts, the Trump administration’s foreign policy operations lack coordination across agencies, leading to annoying oversight and an overall impression of pure amateurism. How else can one understand the failure to consult with Ukraine’s neighbors before announcing a peace plan delivered with a short-term ultimatum for compliance?
If Trump’s foreign policy lacks the systematic approach of previous American presidents, it cannot be entirely attributed to a lack of design. Trump seems more comfortable in his role as the country’s ultimate foreign policy czar. He seems to delight in arriving at his own understanding of the issues and interests at stake, even when it is flawed or woefully oversimplified.
And with almost every major diplomatic decision, he seems to follow his transactional view of human affairs and trust his instincts as the safest source of political wisdom and guidance.
This highly centralized and improvisational approach to managing world affairs has facilitated the rise of special envoys and independent policy staffers in Trump's foreign policy orbit.
The most notable example of this is Steve Witkoff, a billionaire real estate developer with no prior foreign policy experience, whom Trump entrusted as his chief negotiator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Witkoff's unsuitability for the role has been proven time and again, from his amateurish participation in talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where he appeared without his translator or official note-taker, to the ill-prepared August summit between Trump and Putin in Alaska.
While incompetence, or at least lack of prior knowledge, was once thought to have been Witkoff's main handicap, views of him darkened last week when it was revealed that he had recently been advising Russians close to Putin on how to use flattery in dealing with Trump to persuade him to accept Russian positions. The Kremlin's demands included abandoning the idea of supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and incorporating Russian territorial demands into Washington's negotiating strategy to end the war.
Niveli i rehatisë personale dhe besimi me këshilltarët kryesorë ishin të rëndësishëm për presidentët e mëparshëm, por këto konsiderata kanë mbizotëruar shumë mbi ekspertizën ose përvojën në botën e Trump.
Statusi i Witkoff me Trump duket se është forcuar fuqishëm nga roli i tij udhëheqës në negocimin e një fundi të shpallur të konfliktit Izrael-Hamas në Gaza. Në fakt, ajo luftë vazhdon, megjithëse në një formë disi më pak intensive dhe kryesisht jashtë titujve kryesorë, duke i lejuar Trump të pretendojë para kohe sukses.
Megjithatë, përfundimi i luftës së Putinit në Ukrainë nuk ka gjasa të jetë një çështje aq e thjeshtë sa shpallja e një paqeje në Gaza. E zhveshur në thelb, qasja Trump-Witkoff ndaj Gazës dukej se bazohej në një parim të thjeshtë të kapur në shprehjen e lashtë të Tukididit: "të fortët bëjnë atë që munden dhe të dobëtit vuajnë atë që duhet".
Izraeli, pala shumë më e fortë, vështirë se ishte i detyruar të bënte ndonjë lëshim ndaj interesave palestineze në ndjekje të një paqeje të shpallur. Një vështrim i shpejtë në propozimin e paqes prej 28 pikash të Trump, i cili u zëvendësua me shpejtësi nga ai konflikt, krijon përshtypjen se ky shabllon thjesht u transferua në luftën Rusi-Ukrainë.
Papërshtatshmëria e kësaj qasjeje, të cilën një ekip sigurie kombëtare më i organizuar dhe më i kualifikuar mund ta kishte paralajmëruar një president që ishte i gatshëm ta dëgjonte, fillon me neglizhencën nga Shtëpia e Bardhë për faktin se Evropa ka interesa të mëdha në rezultatin e kësaj lufte dhe nuk mund të anashkalohet ose të fshihet nga ndonjë marrëveshje e qëndrueshme.
Gjithashtu injoron faktin se pas viteve të sakrificës së thellë njerëzore dhe materiale në mbrojtje të sovranitetit ukrainas, Presidenti ukrainas Volodymyr Zelensky do të shkatërronte besueshmërinë e tij si udhëheqës, i bërë edhe më i brishtë nga një skandal i kohëve të fundit korrupsioni në nivel të lartë, nëse ai pranonte të nënshkruante pjesë të pamposhtura të rajonit Donbas në mënyrë që të qetësonte Moskën.
Në një nivel edhe më të thellë, dështimi i ekipit Trump për të sfiduar hapur kërkesat maksimaliste të Rusisë mbi Ukrainën duket se rrjedh nga pamundësia e tij për të imagjinuar se mbijetesa politike e vetë Putinit mund të varet nga vazhdimi i kësaj lufte. Kjo për shkak se një fund i armiqësive do ta përqendronte vëmendjen e publikut vendas në kostot e habitshme që Rusia ka paguar, përfshirë humbjen e deri në 1 milion jetëve, në ndjekjen e saj të shekullit të 19-të për zmadhim perandorak. Me fjalë të tjera, Putini jo vetëm që mund të jetë duke u përpjekur ta nënshtrojë Ukrainën dhe të shterojë durimin politik dhe burimet materiale të Evropës. Në mungesë të një fitoreje pothuajse të plotë, e cila duket e pamundur, kontrolli i Putinit mbi Rusinë mund të varet nga shtyrja e çdo llogaridhënieje për marrëzinë e tij të plotë.
The biggest mystery of Trump's foreign policy involves the US president's own motivations. Why has he been so extraordinarily deferential to Putin for so long?
Yes, Russia has a large arsenal of surviving nuclear weapons, but it leads the world in almost nothing; it has a stagnant economy of only average size and prosperity; and it has been dwarfed by China, its wealthy and powerful key partner in an increasingly unbalanced alliance.
None of the possible answers that come to mind justify downgrading or jeopardizing Washington's long-standing partnership with a wealthy and populous Europe. One is that Trump simply admires the ability of authoritarians to make unilateral decisions and put their own personal stamp on their own time.
Another possibility is that Trump admires Russia for its immense size and vast natural resources. These include some of the world’s richest oil reserves, which could excite the imagination of an American leader who seems obsessed with hydrocarbons as a tool of global power and likely harbors memories of the 1980s, when American oil companies coveted a major role in exploiting Russia’s oil and gas resources.
A lust for Venezuela's oil reserves, which are even larger than those of Russia, may also help explain Trump's attempt to exert military pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro largely on the basis of an unsubstantiated accusation that Maduro supplies the United States with deadly fentanyl.
Another view casts doubt on whether Putin has lured Trump with the lure of huge investment opportunities for American companies in a post-war Russia (and Ukraine). At this point, no one would be surprised if this included hints that Trump and members of his family and inner circle, such as Witkoff, could personally benefit in the future from large real estate and natural resource deals.
If this theory is proven, the Trump administration will have destroyed American diplomacy by abandoning the principle that international borders should not be changed by force and by actively ignoring the country's oldest allies.
If overt transactionalism is truly the engine driving US foreign policy, it will completely destroy Washington's standing in the world. /Adapted from Foreign Policy/
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