FLASH
Shkruar nga Gjergj Zefi
In a clash that is consuming America, destabilizing the region and shaking global markets, Beijing is the coldest beneficiary of a disintegrating international order...
In international politics, the winner of a war is not always determined by military superiority on the ground, but by the ability to turn the crisis of others into strategic advantage. It is in this prism that the clash between the United States and Iran should be seen: as a conflict where the direct costs are borne by the warring parties, while the greatest dividends can be reaped by a third actor. And this actor, today, is China.
This does not mean that Beijing is the “right” side, much less a peaceful power in the normative sense of the word. On the contrary, China remains a power guided by cold state interests, long-term calculation, and the ambition to reformat international balances in its favor. But unlike the US and Iran, it does not shoulder the burden of direct confrontation. And in diplomacy, often, he who is not burned by the fire has a free hand to build order behind him.
The United States enters this crisis with the burden of its global status. Any military escalation in the Middle East is not just an operation against Iran; it is also a test of American credibility, of its capacity to manage multiple fronts simultaneously, and of its ability to preserve the order it has built. If Washington strikes hard, it risks draining strategic resources, deepening ally fatigue, and distracting from its main long-term challenge: the rivalry with China. If, on the other hand, it fails to achieve a clear result, then the perception of American power is damaged. In both cases, the cost is not just military; it is political, economic, and symbolic.
Iran, meanwhile, cannot be considered a winner in any serious sense of the term. Even if it manages to survive politically or maintain its state capacity, the price for Iranian society, for regional security, and for economic stability will be very high. Regimes often survive wars; peoples do not always cope with the consequences with the same ease. Therefore, any romantic interpretation of “Iranian resistance” would be as poor as the propaganda that sees the use of American force as an automatic solution.
China benefits not because it necessarily produced this conflict, but because it knows how to read with clarity the weaknesses it exposes. The more the US immerses itself in the Middle East, the more its strategic attention is scattered. The greater the energy and trade uncertainty becomes, the greater the role of powers that operate patiently, with reserve and without directly entering the fire. Beijing does not need to present itself as an ally of Iran or as a frontal adversary of America; it is enough for it to remain on the periphery of the conflict, maintaining supplies, expanding diplomatic contacts and projecting itself as an alternative to a West increasingly consumed by crises.
However, it would be an analytical and moral error to present China as some kind of power of ethical equilibrium. It is not driven by universal principles, but by its own national interest. The rhetoric of peace, dialogue and stability is valid only to the extent that it is consistent with its need for energy, markets and geopolitical influence. So the Chinese benefit from this war is not a sign of any moral superiority, but evidence of the rational cynicism with which the great powers act. In this sense, Beijing is not the solution to the crisis; it is one of its most capable beneficiaries.
This makes a fundamental observation all the more important: modern wars no longer produce just military winners, but also strategic rentiers. Powers that do not enter the field with their boots on the ground, but rather reap the profits from the consumption of others. If the US spends political and military capital; if Iran further destabilizes the region; and if European allies continue to follow the crisis rather than shape it, then the space for China’s relative rise naturally expands.
Herein lies the greatest irony of this clash. A war intended as a show of force may have the opposite effect: not strengthening the existing order, but accelerating its erosion. And in the vacuum that is created, China does not need to win the battle; it only needs to gain time, diplomatic ground, and the fatigue of its adversary.
In the end, the essential question is not whether the US can hit Iran harder, nor whether Iran can withstand the pressure longer. The real question is who is benefiting from the mutual weakening of the parties. So far, the answer seems cold and unpleasant: not because China is more just, more peaceful, or more legitimate, but because in a world where order is faltering, it is proving to be the actor most adept at exploiting uncertainty./ Pamphlet
Pse na thoni kineze, me thote nje Kosovar ne Londer. E do drejt, i thashe. Po, me tha. Ju themi kineze se pse jeni si kinezet qe punoni nen rrogoz e te hani mbas shpine. Wow, me tha i cuditur e kete fjale e perhapi ne tere sorrollopin e tyre.