FLASH
Shkruar nga Diplomatico | Pamfleti.net
The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East and the risk of blocking the Strait of Hormuz are adding pressure on energy markets, while analysts warn that the price of oil could rise by $100 to $150 per barrel if the crisis is prolonged...
The question shaking the markets is no longer whether oil will rise in price, but how far it can go. Under normal circumstances, before the new outbreak of war in the Middle East, the baseline forecasts were relatively calm: The US Energy Information Administration predicted that Brent would average around $58 per barrel in 2026, while JP Morgan talked about an average near $60. But the war has broken this market logic.
Reuters reported that Brent has passed $90 per barrel, while the market has already introduced a "war premium", that is, an additional price dictated not by normal demand, but by fears that global supply could be hit harder in the coming days or weeks.
What makes the situation particularly dangerous is that the market is not just pricing in the loss of a few Iranian barrels, but the systemic risk to the entire Gulf. Reuters points out that about 20% of the world’s oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and the conflict has caused major disruptions in the region, damaged infrastructure, and halted or reduced exports from several key producers. This means that the price of oil no longer depends solely on Iran, but on whether Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Emirates can continue to produce and export normally. Whenever the market doubts this link, the price reacts with extreme nervousness.
In the first scenario, which would be called limited, the war continues, but without a complete and prolonged blockade of Hormuz and without massive destruction of the Gulf's infrastructure.
In this case, oil could remain in a high but still manageable corridor, somewhere around $90 to $110 per barrel. This is the area where the market would continue to hold the “fear premium,” but would believe that global supply could be partially offset by other producers, strategic reserves, and logistical diversions. Even in this scenario, the hit to consumers would be real, because a price above $100 would quickly translate into more expensive fuel, more costly transportation, and inflationary pressure in Europe.
Reuters has quoted analysts who expect high prices for days or weeks even without the market entering the darkest scenario.
In the second scenario, which is that of prolonged escalation, the war continues for weeks, attacks on warehouses, refineries, terminals and tankers multiply, and exports from the Gulf slow down significantly even without a formal total closure of Hormuz. This is where the psychological and economic threshold of $120 comes into play.
Reuters reported that Bernstein has raised its Brent assumption to $80 on an annual basis, but in an extreme case of prolonged conflict it sees the market in the $120 to $150 per barrel range. This is the point when the market stops functioning like a normal commodities market and starts behaving like a panic market, where every new incident, every tanker attacked and every new day of blockade adds a new wave of speculative pressure on the price.
In the third scenario, i.e. in the case of a real and several-week blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the price could enter the $120 to $150 territory, with fluctuations that could temporarily take it even higher. Reuters also quoted Qatar's energy minister as warning that oil could touch $150 per barrel.
Macquarie, according to Reuters, has estimated that the market can withstand a one- or two-week closure, but after the third and especially the fourth week, the effect on the price would accelerate sharply. This is because in the first weeks the market lives on stocks, with the expectation of the opening of the corridor and with the hope that diplomatic or military intervention will unblock the passage; but when the blockage is prolonged, the market begins to price not the crisis, but the real lack of supply.
Then there is the fourth scenario, that of a major global shock, where we not only have a blockade of Hormuz, but also serious damage to terminals, refineries, oil fields, and LNG infrastructure in several countries at once.
Reuters has reported that the conflict has already affected gas terminals in Qatar, refineries in Saudi Arabia and regional export flows, while the IEA has warned that prolonged disruptions could turn the global market from surplus to deficit.
In this scenario, $150 would no longer be a psychological ceiling, but merely the entry into a new phase. Then we would be talking about a classic energy crisis, where the price is no longer determined by the supply-demand model, but by the physical shortage of goods and the struggle to secure supplies.
Could oil go to $180 or $200?
Yes, but that is the extreme scenario, not the base case. For this to happen, several developments would have to come together at once: a prolonged closure of Hormuz, a severe reduction in production in the Persian Gulf, further damage to energy infrastructure, and the inability of other powers to quickly replace the shortage.
The Guardian, citing estimates of the economic effects of the war, warns that energy prices could rise by up to 80% if the outages last, while Reuters speaks of the suspension of a large part of regional production and exports.
A move of this magnitude would not simply be a rise in oil prices; it would be a full-blown global inflationary shock, with consequences for interest rates, economic growth, and political stability in many importing countries.
However, there is a fifth scenario, that of mitigation. If the Strait of Hormuz reopens relatively quickly, if attacks on infrastructure stop, and if the major powers achieve some kind of diplomatic brake, some of the “war premium” could melt away. This means that the price could fall back from panic levels to $75 to $85, perhaps lower over time, gradually approaching the baselines that the EIA and JP Morgan had seen before the outbreak of war. But this would require not only military calm but also a restoration of logistical confidence: ships must pass freely, insurers must lower premiums, refineries must operate normally, and the market must be convinced that supplies are no longer hostage to missiles. Today, this scenario exists, but it is not the one that the market is pricing in the most.
So the most serious answer to the question “how far can the price of oil go?” is this: in a limited crisis, oil could hover around $100; in a protracted war with continuous strikes on infrastructure, it could touch $120 to $150; in an extreme scenario with a prolonged blockade of Hormuz and severe regional disruptions, it could enter $150-plus territory, with a real risk of an explosion even higher. In other words, the first ceiling is $100, the second ceiling is $150, while $200 would no longer be a market, but a global energy crisis. And today, for the first time in a long time, this does not sound like hyperbole, but like a scenario that the market is forced to calculate./ Pamphlet
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