Starmer's departure solves the problem of an unpopular leader, but without a clear political alternative, his successor will have no better luck.
The Labour Party has spent much of the last year paralysed by opposing fears. MPs’ fear of facing voters with Keir Starmer as prime minister has been kept in check by the steppe to start the process of replacing him. They know that the prime minister is an electoral liability; they also know that the electorate does not look kindly on chaotic, “regicide” parties that expose division and factionalism at a time when they are supposed to be governing the country.
Until now, discontent with Starmer’s leadership had been tempered by a reluctance to enter a race that could replace him with someone even weaker. Last week’s local and devolution elections changed all that. Labour MPs now have irrefutable evidence that the party is heading for a national electoral disaster. A growing number believe that this trend will not change if the leader remains the same.
The results were disastrous by any standard, but that was not the only factor that prompted calls from rank-and-file MPs for Starmer’s removal or the wave of resignations at senior levels. The prime minister’s response embodied precisely the traits that his colleagues find irritating about his leadership style. He took responsibility for Labour’s electoral ruin, but in a way that was more defiant than condescending.
In an interview over the weekend, Starmer declared that he intended to stay in Downing Street for a decade. In a speech on Monday, he cast the voters’ crushing verdict on two years of Labour government as part of the usual difficult learning curve for new prime ministers. The solution to public frustration, he said, was not to change direction but to continue on the current course with greater urgency. He said that “gradual change is not enough,” while at the same time showing, through partial and conditional promises, that gradual change is the only political currency he has.
The shortcoming was most apparent on the subject of Brexit. The prime minister spoke sharply about its consequences. He criticised Nigel Farage for shirk- ing responsibility for a list of failed Eurosceptic promises. He promised to return Britain “to the heart of Europe”. These are things he may have believed while in opposition, but which he did not say during the election campaign that brought him to power. Now, in what was presented as a moment of rhetorical liberation, he has again failed to promise to abandon the “red lines” – no membership of the single market and no customs union – that keep Britain on the economic periphery of its own continent.
Starmer said the effort to restore hope and security to the country after taking power had revealed the need for “a bigger response than we had anticipated in 2024”. The use of the plural is significant. Who is the “we” in this analysis? Labour MPs have never questioned the scale of the challenge. Many of them thought the election programme they put before voters was too tepid, but they were persuaded or forced to accept modest ambitions as the price to reassure voters that Starmer had neutralised the party’s radical impulses. Given the history of Labour opposition leaders’ failures to enter Downing Street by other means, this seemed like a good deal. The rare plebiscite victory that followed seemed to confirm this strategy.
If there ever was a definition of “Starmerism,” although the prime minister himself insisted that such a term did not exist, it lay precisely in this calculation. It was the conviction that Britain had been weakened by an incompetent and dogmatic right-wing government, which had been ineffectively opposed by an unrealistic and fanatical left-wing opposition. If the problem was ideological polarization, then the solution had to be pragmatism at the center.
The change voters wanted could be embodied, then, by a grim but serious prime minister who would dedicate himself to governing with a meticulous focus on solving problems. Starmer's few remaining defenders say these are the right qualities and tragically undervalued in an era when politics is viewed with disdain and public anger is fed relentlessly.
The more sympathetic critics accept that Starmer is a decent public servant, but note that a diligent pragmatist should have built a more comprehensive governing program while in opposition. It was naive, at best, to believe that simply replacing bad Conservative ministers with good Labour ministers would be enough to unleash the potential of the civil service and produce good policies.
Gjykimi më i ashpër është se projekti i Starmer e shndërroi pragmatizmin në fetish elektoral, duke lënë politikën reale në plan të dytë; se shmangia e pyetjeve të vështira si financimi i shërbimeve publike apo riparimi i dëmit të Brexit u kthye në ndalim të mendimit për përgjigjet; dhe se vendosmëria për të spastruar Labour nga trashëgimia e Jeremy Corbyn u shndërrua në një obsesion fraksional që e etiketonte çdo kundërshtim si “e majtë toksike”.
Shumica dërrmuese e deputetëve donin me dëshpërim ta mbështesnin liderin e tyre. Por ata kanë pasur vështirësi të kuptojnë se ndaj çfarë po tregojnë besnikëri, kur manovra më e zakonshme e qeverisë është kthesa e vazhdueshme në politika, kur mandati fiskal është vendosur sipas parametrave të zgjedhur nga qeveria e fundit konservatore dhe kur politika e emigracionit tingëllon si një homazh i pakëndshëm ndaj Nigel Farage.
Nëse ministrat nuk arrijnë të artikulojnë me bindje qëllimin e qeverisë së tyre, nuk është çudi që votuesit kërkojnë diku tjetër qartësi politike dhe konfirmim të pakënaqësive të tyre.
As stili monoton i Starmer nuk ndihmon. Por komunikimi i dobët shpesh është simptomë e politikave të paqarta dhe e një qëllimi të pasigurt. Ai mund të kishte qenë një komunikues më bindës nëse do ta kishte ditur qartë se çfarë mesazhi donte të përcillte.
Në opozitë, ai e përmblodhi gjithçka me një fjalë të vetme: “ndryshim”. Ishte e lehtë të nisej ky proces, por e vështirë të provohej me përmbajtje reale. Çdo meritë që kryeministri i ri fitoi thjesht sepse “nuk ishte konservator” u konsumua sapo hyri në Numrin 10. Që nga dita e parë, pjesa më e madhe e medias londineze e trajtoi qeverinë e Labour jo si një shprehje legjitime të vullnetit demokratik, por si efekt anësor i dëshirës së votuesve për t’u çliruar sa më shpejt nga konservatorët.
Çdo skandal dhe çdo gabim e zbehu ndjesinë e ndryshimit nga regjimi i vjetër. Starmer kishte qenë një enë bosh ku votuesit kishin projektuar shpresat për rilindje. Pa krijuar momentum në ndonjë drejtim të qartë, ai më pas u kthye në depozitën e gjithë zemërimit të grumbulluar ndaj politikanëve që premtojnë gjithçka dhe nuk realizojnë asgjë.
Kjo ndihmon të kuptohet intensiteti i zemërimit që aktivistët e Labour hasën ndaj liderit të tyre gjatë fushatës një urrejtje helmuese që trondit edhe deputetët më të zhgënjyer. Ajo nuk ka asnjë ngjashmëri me kritikat më të buta ndaj Starmer si një burrë shteti i ndershëm, aftësitë administrative të të cilit janë sabotuar nga mungesa e një vizioni të qartë politik.
For a party facing the prospect of political annihilation, it matters little whether voters’ contempt for its leader is unjust, as long as it seems irreversible. Starmer’s refusal to accept that he himself is the problem, by offering more of himself as the solution, is a key factor in turning private doubts into public demands for a change of direction. The last reserves of goodwill have been consumed by the sense that the prime minister is too attached to his self-image as a man of principle. What he presents as a civic duty to continue serving his country seems to many to be a refuge in arrogant denial of reality.
Many of his predecessors have ended up in the same place. The extreme intensity of the task often creates a kind of arrogance in those who exercise it, making them believe that no one else in their ranks can handle the role. They have often been right. British politics in recent years offers plenty of examples of how a prime minister should not govern.
The candidates already maneuvering in the shadows to take over Labour’s next leadership must believe that it will be different for them. This self-confidence is part of the psychology of ambition that drives people to the top. Starmer cultivated this belief as opposition leader, having seen three Tory prime ministers fail one after another. He believed he could be the change the country needed. It wasn’t enough. It didn’t come close. So what was missing? When did it all start to go wrong?
Removing Keir Starmer is a solution to the problem of having Keir Starmer as leader. Nothing more. It is not a diagnosis of what the country has been missing, nor a vision of where Britain should be heading. Whoever intends to replace him must have the courage to articulate these things now. They must make the case for a leadership contest by presenting a credible alternative. Otherwise, the only prize of succession will be to become the new face of the same old problem./Adapted from "Pamphlet", from "The Guardian"
Lini një Përgjigje