FLASH
Shkruar nga Daniel Serwer
China's rapid build-up of nuclear power also complicates the US-Russia equation, as nuclear balance is harder to establish when three tango, rather than two...
I can applaud the treaty banning nuclear weapons as morally and legally sound, without thinking, however, that any of today's nine nuclear states are likely to join it. Nuclear weapons exist because the states that possess them believe they are necessary for national security or regime preservation. To convince them to give up their weapons, you would have to convince them that they would be safer without them. That is possible.
I was involved as a U.S. diplomat in the 1980s in efforts to persuade Brazil and Argentina to talk about a mutual stance that was implemented in the 1990s. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons when the end of apartheid eased its concerns about its neighbors. Much of Europe and Asia have preferred to live under an American nuclear umbrella rather than face the costs and risks of developing their own nuclear weapons.
The US and the Soviet Union managed to negotiate serious limits on the number of nuclear weapons, which I still hope they will renew or even reduce. At least the Americans have wanted to reduce the number of them in stockpiles for a long time. Maintaining them is expensive. However, diplomacy becomes much more difficult when three or more countries are involved, especially when they are very close to each other.
Pakistan and India are a good example. Pakistan only has India's nuclear weapons to worry about, but India is more worried about China's than Pakistan's. And China is more worried about the US than India.
So the kind of bilateral agreement negotiated between Buenos Aires and Brasilia has not proven possible for New Delhi and Islamabad. China's rapid build-up of nuclear power also complicates the US-Russia equation, as the nuclear balance is harder to balance with three to tango than with two.
Israel is not giving up its nuclear weapons, and most Arab countries, while complaining about them, have not insisted that the Israelis get rid of them. I conclude, then, that there is little chance that any of today's nuclear powers will join the nuclear ban.
However, my greatest concern today is about nuclear proliferation, not nuclear weapons reduction. Those of us who were involved in preventing proliferation in the 1970s and 1980s had an extraordinary success measured against the expectations of that era.
The only new nuclear powers since then are Pakistan and North Korea, not the dozen or more we had anticipated. But for some reason, that success seems to be in jeopardy. The science and technology needed to build nuclear weapons is much more widely available than it was 40 years ago.
The necessary basic data is widely available, and centrifuges have made enrichment easier than gaseous diffusion and other methods. President Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on whether the US nuclear umbrella will be used to protect its allies, especially in East Asia.
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan all have the capability to build a nuclear weapon, or perhaps more than a few nuclear weapons, within a few weeks.
South Korea is actively debating the nuclear option. While Japan has a strong cultural inhibition regarding nuclear weapons, it will become more difficult to remain non-nuclear if Seoul moves forward.
Taiwan's incentives to build nuclear weapons increase with every Chinese test of invasion plans. The Middle East is not much better than East Asia. While Israel has seriously damaged Iran's nuclear capabilities, the 12-day war gave Tehran a strong incentive to end Israel's regional monopoly.
It is hard to imagine Turkey and Saudi Arabia sitting idly by if this happens. Both President Erdogan and Mohammed bin Salman have said they will match Iran's capabilities. The Saudis have already reached a deal that in principle puts Pakistani nuclear weapons at the Kingdom's disposal.
Can Egypt's President Sisi remain restrained if Turkey and Saudi Arabia gain nuclear protection?
Let me end up in Europe.
If any part of Ukraine remains independent and sovereign after the current war, it will want nuclear weapons, which everyone in Kiev thinks would have prevented a full-scale invasion in 2022.
The only way to prevent Ukraine from getting its own is NATO membership, which comes with an unwavering commitment to remain non-nuclear. That's what we made Germany promise. The same will apply to Ukraine.
It may sound heretical, but when it comes to Europe's role in defending the future, Ukraine's inclusion in NATO would be a major contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A more reasonable Russia would be wise to welcome it too!/ Adapted from "Peacefare"
Lini një Përgjigje