FLASH
Shkruar nga Ian Bremmer
When the main objectives of two warring parties are fundamentally incompatible, no amount of external pressure or diplomatic intervention can bridge the gap between them. Peace in Ukraine will come eventually, but it almost certainly will not come from US President Donald Trump's current diplomatic push, despite the deadlines he sets...
Nearly four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, efforts to end the war are intensifying. Diplomacy over the past few weeks has produced not one but two proposals, as U.S. envoys shuttle between Kiev and Moscow. Amid public displays of applause, often feigned, for President Donald Trump’s efforts to stop the bloodshed, everyone is scrambling to shape the terms of peace, as well as the realities on the ground.
Yet despite the flurry of diplomatic activity, the chances of a ceasefire remain slim. We are unlikely to see one within weeks, or even months. The reason is clear: Russia and Ukraine still have fundamentally incompatible goals, and neither side has found sufficient reason to compromise. Trump’s sole focus on reaching a deal (regardless of the details) has not changed either side’s strategic calculus.
Trump has made ending the war, despite the consequences for Ukraine and Europe, a high priority for his second term, and he is upset that it has not yet happened. When you want to reach a deal at the lowest possible cost and don’t particularly care about the terms or broader short- or long-term implications, the path of least resistance is to pressure the weaker side.
The weakest side, of course, is Ukraine, not only because it has a smaller economy, population, and military than Russia, but also because it is embroiled in a corruption scandal that recently targeted President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak. Recognizing that Zelensky is in a challenging position domestically, Trump and his advisers smell an opportunity. Pressure on Ukraine may now be more likely to yield results.
But what they don’t seem to understand is that Zelensky’s weakness makes concessions harder, not easier. While recent polls suggest that only a quarter of Ukrainians want to fight until complete victory, a dramatic reversal from the early years of the war, the same polls show that a majority of Ukrainians still want an end to the war on Ukrainian, not Russian, terms. Even if he were so inclined, a politically weak Zelensky could not support an agreement that resembles capitulation, and which his people and military would overwhelmingly reject.
For its part, Russia knows it holds a stronger position and is not trying to reach terms that Ukraine can accept. In fact, President Vladimir Putin is not trying to end the war at all, because he believes he can achieve better results on the battlefield than at the negotiating table. Russian forces are making slow and difficult progress in the Donbas, and although the costs are high, tens of thousands of casualties, economic strain, and international isolation, Putin has shown that he is willing to bear them. He remains convinced that time is on his side.
By making maximalist demands that he knows Ukraine cannot accept—de jure recognition of Russia's territorial annexations, Ukrainian neutrality without meaningful security guarantees, and effective restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty—Putin is exploiting Trump's impatience for a deal.
The Kremlin’s goal is not to negotiate in good faith; it is to appear cooperative to Trump and sympathetic European leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, in the hope that the United States will blame Ukraine for the inevitable diplomatic failure. In Putin’s best-case scenario, this strategy gives Russia two things: greater impunity for its attacks on Ukraine (which might otherwise provoke American retaliation) and a more divided NATO.
But Putin’s strategy has limits. Trump has already shown that he can stand up to Russia. When frustrated by Putin’s stubbornness earlier this year, the US gave Ukraine permission to conduct long-range strikes inside Russia, imposed new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, and pressured India to reduce its purchases of Russian oil. Moreover, Ukraine, Europe, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have done enough (so far) to maintain intelligence sharing with Ukraine and continue to allow deep strikes on Russian oil infrastructure.
The other limitation of Putin’s strategy is that Trump no longer controls Ukraine’s lifeline. The US is selling weapons and providing intelligence, but European countries are now fully financing Ukraine’s war effort. That significantly reduces Washington’s leverage over Kiev. And whether by tapping Russia’s frozen assets or issuing more joint debt, European leaders have made it clear that they will not let Ukraine lose out for lack of money.
So the war will continue through another round of failed talks, another winter, and perhaps another spring. Russian forces will continue to try to seize more territory. Ukraine will continue to defend itself while hitting Russian infrastructure. The human and economic costs will mount. Ukraine’s position is likely to worsen, even as Russia pays a heavy price in blood and treasure for limited gains. There will be little willingness to compromise anytime soon.
I wish it weren’t so. But when the parties’ core objectives are fundamentally incompatible, no amount of pressure or foreign diplomacy can bridge the gap. Peace will come eventually, but only when the battlefield and material circumstances compel it. It won’t come from Trump’s current diplomatic push, no matter how many deadlines he sets. /Adapted from Project-Syndicate/
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